Indiana Law Update Blog - Price Waicukauski & Riley Legal Blog

Excellent Analysis of Upcoming Indiana SCOTUS Argument

General

February 28, 2012

Ron and others from our firm represent the appellees in City of Indianapolis v. Armour, a case that will be argued to the Supreme Court of the United States tomorrow, February 29, 2012. We told you about the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in the case here.

Yesterday, Lyle Denniston with SCOTUSblog published an excellent analysis of the issues to be raised in that argument. If you are interested in understanding what the case is truly about, I recommend this article.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
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TAG US Supreme Court

Recusal of Judge is Required When the Chair of Judge's Election Campaign Appears as Counsel

Professional Conduct

February 27, 2012

In Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), Cause No. 53A05-1012-SC-790, the Indiana Court of Appeals has made it clear--a judge cannot hear a case if the recent chair of the judge's election campaign represents one of the parties.

Bloomington Magazine, Inc. ("Bloom") sued Kiang for payment for ads in the magazine. The trial judge, Valeri Haughton of the Monroe Circuit Court, found in favor of Kiang and Bloom appealed. While the case was on appeal, Bloom discovered that Kiang's lawyer, Geoffrey Grodner, had been Chair of Judge Haughton's campaign committee for the 2008 election. Bloom moved for leave to file a motion in the trial court to set aside the judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B). The Court of Appeals granted the motion.

Bloom then moved in the trial court to set aside the judgment and for recusal of the judge. The trial court denied the motion to recuse and denied the motion to set aside the judgment. Bloom appealed again, arguing that Haughton's impartiality could reasonably be questioned and pursuant to the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, she should have disclosed her relationship with Grodner on the record and should have granted the recusal motion.

The Court of Appeals found that whether a lawyer serving on a campaign committee would disqualify a trial judge (in matters involving the lawyer) will depend on the proximity in time between the election campaign and the litigation. The court cited with approval a Florida case that suggested a two-year standard. Here Grodner appeared in the lawsuit in February 2009, just three months after the November 2008 election in which he had been Haughton's campaign chair. This was less than two years and not sufficiently "remote in time" to "dispel the appearance of impropriety such that a reasonable person would have a rational basis for doubting her impartiality."

Lessons:

A judge should give notice when counsel in her court has served on her campaign committee.
If the campaign work was within two years, the judge should recuse herself if requested by a party.
While a case is on appeal, if evidence is newly discovered that gives rise to a T.R. 60(B) motion, seek leave from the Court of Appeals before filing the motion in the trial court.

Ronald J. Waicukauski
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Download a copy of this article here

TAG Elections, IN Court of Appeals, Judicial Recusal, Rule 60(b)

Proof of a Negative Not Required for Summary Judgment

Procedure/Summary Judgment

February 27, 2012

The Indiana Court of Appeals has issued a decision that may have a large impact on summary judgment practice in Indiana. In Commr. of the Indiana Dept. of Ins. v. Black, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), the Court essentially held that Indiana will apply the standard set forth in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), at least in some circumstances.

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Tim Black alleged that Dr. Harris and others rendered negligent care to his wife after she complained of chest pain. The negligence allegedly resulted in severe cardiac arrest and resulted in the need for a heart transplant. The medical review panel unanimously concluded that Dr. Harris failed to comply with the applicable standard of care.

After the panel decision, Black filed a petition seeking payment of $1 million from the Patient's Compensation Fund and asserted that he had settled with Dr. Harris for $250,000, thereby satisfying the qualifying amount to get to the fund. The Commissioner sought discovery of the settlement agreement but Black refused to produce it, saying it was confidential. Black did produce a copy of an unauthenticated check in the amount $250,000 from the Medical Assurance Co., made payable to Black and his counsel. Black also produced some correspondence between counsel that discussed a prospective settlement.

The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition claiming that he needed the settlement agreement in order to make payment. It was not clear from the check whether the payment was for settlement with Dr. Harris or other defendants. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and after conducting a hearing on damages, ordered the Commissioner to pay Black $1 million. The Commissioner appealed.

In considering the motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals observed that matters outside the pleadings were submitted in support of the motion to dismiss and were relied on by the trial court. In light of this fact, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to T.R. 12(B), treated the motion as one for summary judgment. In a footnote, the court recognized that T.R. 12(B) requires that "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56." Although no such "opportunity" was given, the court found there was "no prejudice" and proceeded to consider the appeal as a summary judgment case.

The court noted that the Commissioner's position on the motion required him to prove a negative—-that there was no settlement with Harris for $250,000. In Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1994), the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the view that a party seeking summary judgment could simply point to the opponent’s burden of proof at trial and prevail unless the non-movant produced evidence supporting its claim or defense. This ruling has for many years been perceived as being at odds with Celotex, in which the U.S. Supreme Court reached a different conclusion under the federal rules. In 2000, Justice Boehm, in dissenting from a denial of transfer in Lenhart Tool & Die, Inc. v. Lumpe, 722 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 2000), expressed the view that a party who puts forward evidence that a non-movant will be unable to present evidence to prove an essential element of its claim or defense, should be entitled to summary judgment if the non-movant fails to present such evidence. In Black, the Court of Appeals held: "Today, we accept Justice Boehm's views on this subject expressed in his dissent."

Having adopted this new standard, however, the Court of Appeals found that in this case, based on the unauthenticated check and the settlement correspondence, there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether a $250,000 settlement on Black’s claim against Harris had been accomplished. So, the Commissioner was not entitled to summary judgment. Black was also not entitled to a judgment on his claim since it was not clear that the required settlement with Harris for $250,000 had been consummated.

The Court held that the Commissioner is entitled to discovery of the settlement agreement and that the confidentiality term in the settlement agreement would not trump the Commissioner's right to such discovery. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Lessons:

The Celotex rule now applies to Indiana state court cases and Jarboe does not (subject to further ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court).
An appellate court can convert a 12(B)(6)motion to a motion for summary judgment without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard if there’s no prejudice to the parties.

Ronald J. Waicukauski
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TAG Celotex, IN Court of Appeals, Jarboe, Summary Judgment

Back Pay Award Reduced Based on Laches in Class Action

Laches

February 27, 2012

The Indiana Supreme Court recently decided what could prove to be a landmark decision on the doctrine of laches in Richmond State Hospital v. Brattain, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2012), Cause No. 49S02-1106-CV-327. If you are dealing with a case involving laches, this decision is a must read.

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In this class action, employees who worked in "state institutions" claimed that the State had breached its contractual duty to provide equal pay for equal work by requiring that they work 40 hours per week for the same pay as employees in "state offices" who were only required to work 37.5 hours per week. The trial court found in favor of the employees and awarded 20 years of back pay, amounting to $42,422,788. The Court of Appeals reduced that award substantially by limiting back pay to a few months for merit employees but for non-merit employees, affirmed a recovery for 20 years of damages or about $18.7 million.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and then failed to reach a majority on numerous issues, dividing 2-2. Justice Sullivan did not participate, presumably because he served as State Budget Director during the period in dispute. As a result of the 2-2 split, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on the merit employees' claims. As to the non-merit employees, the Supreme Court was able to reach a consensus, largely in favor of the State's laches defense.

The Court described the elements of a laches defense as follows:

To prevail in a defense of laches, the defendant must show "inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party." Despite this structured test, "there is no fixed or definite rule for the application of the doctrine of laches."

The Court found that there was inexcusable delay in not asserting the non-merit employees' claim until 2002, which was 45 years after the split-pay system was initiated; 11 years after the split-pay system was determined to be unlawful in the Arden decision (in 1991); and 9 years after the merit employees' claim was initiated and the split-pay system was abolished (in 1993). Although this delay was determined to be unreasonable, the Court was not fully persuaded on the issue of prejudice and decided to limit back pay for non-merit employees to a few months in 2003, the same result that had been reached for merit employees by the Court of Appeals, although for different reasons. The exact amount remains to be determined.

Lessons:

This case is the new starting point for Indiana law on laches.
After 19 years, the Supreme Court will push a case to conclusion even when no majority could be assembled on most issues.

Ronald J. Waicukauski
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Download a copy of this article here

TAG Back Pay, IN Supreme Court, Laches

February 23, 2012 Indiana Law Club Presentation

Ind. Law Club

On February 23, 2012, Ron Waicukauski and Brad Catlin presented an update on Indiana law to the monthly meeting of the Indianapolis Law Club. You can download a copy of his handout at that presentation here. An audio version of his presentation can be downloaded here.

Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
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District Courts Have Lots of Discretion Over Whether to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction

Federal Jurisdiction

February 20, 2012

Last week, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Products N. Amer., Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2012), Cause No. 11-1268, that surprised me. At issue was the level of discretion that district courts have when deciding to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. It turns out that they have a lot.

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In July 2009, two owner-operators of BP-franchise gasoline stations sued BP in Illinois state court, asserting both state and federal claims. The plaintiffs' state law claims were under both Indiana and Illinois law. The case was removed to federal court based on the court's federal question jurisdiction.

Over the next 15 months, the district court held 35 hearings, issued 45 orders, and considered 70 motions. The parties compiled 21 volumes of discovery material. Along the way the judge held that one of the plaintiffs had violated discovery rules and several court orders, but withheld judgment on the specific sanction. A two-week trial was scheduled to begin on January 18, 2011.

At a pretrial hearing on January 7, 2011, the plaintiffs informed the court that they would not be pursuing their federal claim after all. The district court dismissed that claim. On January 12, the district court issued a short, tentative order regarding the parties' summary judgment motions, reserving a final ruling until trial. That same day, the Court noted that all federal claims had been dismissed and asked the parties if there was a reason to keep the case in federal court. BP argued that there were, but the next day (two business days before trial) the district court relinquished jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court. BP appealed.

On appeal, the Court emphasized that the district court has broad discretion over whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction and that there is a presumption in favor of remand. Despite the facts described above, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

This case focuses entirely on considerations of judicial economy and potential duplication of judicial effort. BP contends that the district court invested so much time superintending this litigation that the presumption in favor of relinquishment has been overcome. The district court is the best judge of that; our review examines only whether the court made "a considered determination of whether it should hear the claims." Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the judge considered the relevant factors and determined that her work on the case was not so enmeshed in substantive issues of state law that the presumption in favor of remand should be set aside. That decision makes sense—-especially where, as here, the claims remaining in the case include complex common-law business torts and claims for violation of state statutory franchise law.

BP attempted at argue that the district court had been enmeshed in the merits of the case, but the Court disagreed, noting that most of the court's activity had been related to discovery and that the only substantive decision was a tentative ruling on the motions for summary judgment. this pretrial activity (including the pending motion for sanctions) did not overcome the presumption of remanding the case to state court.

The Court's description of the facts indicates that it may believe that the plaintiffs' actions in this case smack of gamesmanship. Therefore, this case shows both the amount of discretion that the Court gives to district courts on this issue and the strength of the presumption in favor of remand.

Lessons:

There is a presumption against exercising supplemental jurisdiction if federal claims are dismissed.
A district court's decision to remand a case if the federal claims are resolved will be affirmed if the district court makes a considered determination of whether it should hear the claims.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
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TAG 7th Circuit, Supplemental Jurisdiction

District Court Erred When Reducing a Prevailing Party's Attorney Fee Award

Attorney's Fees

February 20, 2012

Last week, the Seventh Circuit addressed some of the issues that come into play when a statute authorizes the award of attorney's fees in Johnson v. GDF, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2012), Case No. 11-1934. This case is particularly helpful on these issues because it found that the district court abused its discretion on these issues.

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Johnson was the named plaintiff who brought a class action in state court against his employer for overtime wage violations. Class certification in that case was ultimately denied and the matter proceeded towards trial. Meanwhile, Johnson filed a lawsuit in federal court, which asserted that he was fired in retaliation for filing the state court action.

While the state court action was proceeding towards trial, the employer offered to settle both lawsuits for $25,000. Johnson rejected the offer. The state suit was resolved by a consent judgment a month later and the employer paid Johnson $4,328.77 in overtime wages plus interest and attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, the federal lawsuit continued without any additional settlement talks. Moreover, the employer did not make a Rule 68(a) offer of judgment, not even one limited to the issue of liability. The case proceeded to a three-day trial, after which the jury returned a verdict for Johnson, which awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. After the district court denied post-trial motions by both parties, both parties appealed. The parties then mediated their dispute and, after the employer agreed to pay Johnson more money, the appeals were dismissed.

As the prevailing party, Johnson was entitled to attorney's fees, so his counsel made a fee application for $112,566.87. The employer disputed the amount of these fees for multiple reasons. A magistrate judge heard the fee dispute and recommended a total award of fees and costs in the amount of $1.864.20. The district court accepted the recommendation and Johnson appealed.

On appeal, the Court found that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that all but 4 of 190 billed hours were unnecessary. When concluding that the district court erred, the Court found that both the fact that the employer did not admit liability and that the case went to trial were of critical importance.

GDF knew (approximately) what it was up against and proceeded to trial, without an offer of judgment or any concession of liability. GDF tested its luck and lost. Now it must pay for the attorney hours reasonably required to see the case through trial, to appeal, and for the collection of fees.

The Court also criticized the district court's decision to reduce the hourly rate charged by Johnson's attorney to the maximum rate that this attorney had been awarded in a case in which his hourly rate had been challenged.

In considering the next best evidence [of a reasonable hourly rate], the district court disregarded Rossiello's third-party affidavits because the affiants declared that they do not bill at different rates for FLSA and Title VII cases. The district court decided that billing rates for FLSA and Title VII cases must be diffe rent-—other Northern District of Illinois judges have said that FLSA cases are less complex than Title VII cases and we've mentioned this observation too. Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2001). Rossiello, however, is entitled to the prevailing market rate for his services. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to decide that the market must distinguish between FLSA and Title VII cases. Either it does or it doesn't, but it is not the court's job to say that it should. If the market does distinguish FLSA and Title VII retaliation cases, then, presumably, defendants could submit affidavits saying so. It is not enough to say that courts have distinguished these types of cases (much less, straight overtime cases like Small) and, therefore, any affidavits to the contrary will be unpersuasive.

Once the affidavits were set aside, the district court considered evidence of Rossiello's fee awards in similar cases. The court concluded that Rossiello did not establish "that he was ever awarded a $600 rate in any FLSA case where his fee was challenged." The highest challenged rate he had recovered was $375, so the court decided that was reasonable and what he should receive in this case. But as we reemphasized in Pickett (another case involving Rossiello, incidentally), "[n]othing in the case law requires that a party show that the hourly rate they have requested has previously been disputed and upheld . ... Indeed, a previous attorneys' fee award is useful for establishing a reasonable market rate for similar work whether it is disputed or not." It was therefore an abuse of discretion for the district court to set Rossiello's rate by considering only cases where his fees were challenged.

Finally, the district court erred by not awarding Johnson his trial costs.

Ultimately, this case shows that when defending against a claim for attorney's fees, the wisest course of action will me to amass evidence regarding the prevailing market rate, rather than focusing your factfinding on the particular counsel requesting fees. The employer in this case appears to have made a strategic error by amassing evidence regarding Johnson's counsel, why ignoring other issue, such as whether there is a different market rate for FLSA and Title VII retaliation claims.

Lessons:

A court should not reduce an attorney fee application merely because it believes a case should have been settled.
A court cannot assume without evidence that the market must distinguish between the market rate for two different types of litigation.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
Learn more about Brad and contact us

TAG 7th Circuit, Reasonable Hourly Rate, Reasonable Hours

Termination Letter Does Not Terminate Contract

Contracts

February 20, 2012

In a memorandum decision, uncitable as authority under App. R. 65(D), the Indiana Court of Appeals emphasized that a letter which allegedly terminates a contract must actually say that it is terminating the contract in order to do so. For tis reason alone, City of Fort Wayne v. Town of Huntertown, Cause No. 02A05-1107-MI-384, teaches us a lesson.

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Fort Wayne entered into a contract with Huntertown to treat Huntertown's sewage in 1985. The contract allowed either part to terminate the contract by providing written notice of the desire to terminate the contract. In 2002, Fort Wayne sent a letter to Huntertown indicating that Fort Wayne wished "to open negotiations on the exact terms of the agreement that governs our relationship." However, that letter did not specifically state that Fort Wayne was terminating the contract. In 2009, Fort Wayne informed Huntertown that it considered the contract terminated because of the 2002 letter.

Huntertown filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that Fort Wayne's 2002 letter did not constitute sufficient notice of Fort Wayne's intent to terminate the contract. After cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court granted judgment to Huntertown. Fort Wayne appealed.

On appeal, the Court agreed with the trial court.

[The] letter indicated Fort Wayne's desire to continue-—not terminate—-its relationship with Huntertown. More specifically, as set forth above, the letter explicitly stated that it is "formal notice" of Fort Wayne's request to Huntertown to open negotiations on the exact terms of the agreement that governs the parties' continuing relationship. Most significantly, the 2002 letter did not indicate a desire to terminate the Agreement in the absence of a new agreement. Moreover, there is no showing that it made a continuation of the parties’ relationship contingent upon the negotiation of a new contract.

We cannot say that simply expressing a desire to begin negotiations on a new contract is synonymous with terminating an existing contract. Had Fort Wayne desired to actually terminate the Agreement, it should have expressly indicated as such. And by its plain language, the intent of the 2002 letter is to invite Huntertown to negotiate terms going forward. ...

By requesting future negotiations and not expressly stating an intention to terminate, Fort Wayne could have its cake and eat it too. If the parties' negotiations failed to result in a satisfactory new agreement, the former Agreement would remain in effect and the relationship would continue. Given the statements made in the 2002 letter, it is obvious that Fort Wayne preferred continuation of the relationship with Huntertown to no relationship at all. Put another way, we cannot say that the equivocal expressions communicated in the 2002 Letter satisfied the contractual requirements for termination under section 2 of the Agreement.

The lesson here is plain. If a contract provides for written notification of termination of the contract, then the written notice should "provide express, clear, direct and unequivocal notice" of the intent to terminate the contract. Anything less may be insufficient to extract your client from the agreement.

Lesson:

A written notice to terminate a contract must provide express, clear, direct and unequivocal notice of the intent to terminate the contract.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
Learn more about Brad and contact us

TAG Contract, IN Court of Appeals, Notice of Termination

Immunity for Detaining Mentally Ill Can Precede Filing of Paperwork

Immunity

February 20, 2012

In Berryhill v. Parkview Hosp., ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), Cause No. 02A04-1108-SC-400, the Indiana Court of Appeals appears to have answered a question of first impression when dealing with a hospital's immunity when dealing with the mentally ill. The case appears to be important outside of this limited context, as it indicated the manner in which the Court of Appeals will interpret statutes that provide immunity to persons or organizations for particular activities.

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In this case, Berryhill had suffered a stroke and had brain surgery. At some point after this, he got into a fight with his wife over the television remote. The couple's son persuaded Berryhill to go to the hospital. Berryhill told the triage nurse that he was there because his wife thought that he was "nuts" and wanted to commit him to the "psycho ward." Doctors began to perform tests on Berryhill.

After being at the hospital for about 2 hours, Berryhill became very aggressive and demanded to go home. His doctor was concerned that he may hurt himself or others, so security officers were called to place Berryhill in a secure room, where Berryhill was given a sedative.

At some point after this, but on the same day, Berryhill's wife signed an application for emergency detention, which the trial court granted. Berryhill was discharged two days later.

Berryhill brought an action against the hospital, asserting false imprisonment. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the hospital, so Berryhill appealed.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the hospital was immune under IC 12-26-2-6. That statute provides immunity to people who participate in a detention proceeding or assist in the detention of an individual alleged to have a mental illness. Berryhill argued that this statute did not apply to his attempt to leave the hospital because his wife did not sign the application for emergency detention until after he was detained against his will. The Court disagreed.

Reduced to its essence, Indiana Code Section 12-26-5-1(a) says that "[a]n individual may be detained in a facility for not more than seventy-two (72) hours ... if a written application for detention is filed with the facility." (Emphasis added.) Notably, the statute does not say that an individual may not be detained until after a written application for detention is filed. Indeed, the statute does not specify when the written application must be filed. In this case, the application for detention was based primarily on the very behavior that led to Berryhill being restrained by Parkview's security guards. We cannot conclude that the legislature intended to leave healthcare facilities and their employees powerless to detain individuals who are mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled before an application for detention is filed. As such, without deciding precisely when Berryhill was detained for purposes of Indiana Code Section 12-26-5-1, we conclude that the security guards "act[ed] according to" Indiana Code Article 12-26, which governs the voluntary and involuntary treatment of mentally ill individuals, and "assist[ed] in the detention, care, and treatment of an individual alleged … to have a mental illness" for purposes of Indiana Code Section 12-26-2-6(a).

I find the jurisprudential aspects of this decision more interesting than the decision itself, as this case offers insight into how the Indiana Court of Appeal will interpret statutes governing immunity. The Court made no reference to the concept that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. Instead, it relied on the statutory canons that statutes must be applied in a logical manner consistent with the underlying goals and policy of the statute.

This method of analysis is likely to broaden the scope of statutes that grant immunity to various entities in Indiana. Indiana's litigators must take this into account when assessing the strength of their clients' claims, if a statutory immunity could be involved.

Lesson:

A person can be immune for detaining a person who is allegedly mentally ill, even if the paperwork authorizing that detention is not filed until after the detention.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
Learn more about Brad and contact us

TAG IN Court of Appeals, Mental Health, Statutory Immunity

A Nonparty Is Not Entitled to a Change of Judge in Contempt Proceedings

Procedure

February 9, 2012

In In re the Paternity of N.T., ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), Cause No. 09A02-1108-JP-693, the trial court began contempt proceedings against a child's mother and stepfather because they hid the child from the father for over four years. The stepfather had not previously been a party tot he proceedings and moved for a change of judge after he was served with the application for contempt. The trial court granted that motion and the father appealed.

On appeal, the Court held that courts have the inherent power to hold nonparties in contempt and that doing so does not make them parties to the proceeding. As only parties are entitled to a change of judge under Trial Rule 76, the trial court erred when granting the stepfather's motion.

Lesson:

A nonparty is not entitled to a change of judge merely because contempt proceedings have been brought against that nonparty.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
Learn more about Brad and contact us

TAG Change of Judge, Contempt, IN Court of Appeals

15 entries in '2012/02'

Excellent Analysis of Upcoming Indiana SCOTUS Argument

Recusal of Judge is Required When the Chair of Judge's Election Campaign Appears as Counsel

Proof of a Negative Not Required for Summary Judgment

Back Pay Award Reduced Based on Laches in Class Action

February 23, 2012 Indiana Law Club Presentation

District Courts Have Lots of Discretion Over Whether to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction

District Court Erred When Reducing a Prevailing Party's Attorney Fee Award

Termination Letter Does Not Terminate Contract

Immunity for Detaining Mentally Ill Can Precede Filing of Paperwork

A Nonparty Is Not Entitled to a Change of Judge in Contempt Proceedings

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