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In this case, Berryhill had suffered a stroke and had brain surgery. At some point after this, he got into a fight with his wife over the television remote. The couple's son persuaded Berryhill to go to the hospital. Berryhill told the triage nurse that he was there because his wife thought that he was "nuts" and wanted to commit him to the "psycho ward." Doctors began to perform tests on Berryhill.

After being at the hospital for about 2 hours, Berryhill became very aggressive and demanded to go home. His doctor was concerned that he may hurt himself or others, so security officers were called to place Berryhill in a secure room, where Berryhill was given a sedative.

At some point after this, but on the same day, Berryhill's wife signed an application for emergency detention, which the trial court granted. Berryhill was discharged two days later.

Berryhill brought an action against the hospital, asserting false imprisonment. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the hospital, so Berryhill appealed.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the hospital was immune under IC 12-26-2-6. That statute provides immunity to people who participate in a detention proceeding or assist in the detention of an individual alleged to have a mental illness. Berryhill argued that this statute did not apply to his attempt to leave the hospital because his wife did not sign the application for emergency detention until after he was detained against his will. The Court disagreed.


I find the jurisprudential aspects of this decision more interesting than the decision itself, as this case offers insight into how the Indiana Court of Appeal will interpret statutes governing immunity. The Court made no reference to the concept that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. Instead, it relied on the statutory canons that statutes must be applied in a logical manner consistent with the underlying goals and policy of the statute.

This method of analysis is likely to broaden the scope of statutes that grant immunity to various entities in Indiana. Indiana's litigators must take this into account when assessing the strength of their clients' claims, if a statutory immunity could be involved.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
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During her term as County Auditor, Clements began to investigate software for the evaluation and assessment of property taxes. She received proposals from various companies and presented two of them to the County Council, who chose one. After the County Council's vote, the County's current vendor offered to make the necessary changes at a substantially smaller cost. At some point, a dispute arose between the County and the vendor it selected. The County then filed a complaint against the vendor and Clements. The complaint alleged that Clements knowingly misrepresented to County officials that the cost of continuing to use the county's former vendor would have been similar to the cost of using the current vendor.

Clements moved for summary judgment, claiming governmental immunity, and the trial court granted that motion. Clements then filed a motion to require the County to reimburse her for attorney fees and costs based on I.C. § 34-13-3-5. The trial court found that I.C. § 34-13-3-5 was ambiguous and was intended to apply only "where a third party claimant has filed a claim against a governmental employee personally." Therefore, it denied Clements's request for attorney's fees. Both Clements and the County appealed.

On appeal, the County argued that immunity cannot be granted on summary judgment any time the plaintiff merely alleges intentional misconduct or fraud. The Court disagreed.


The Court then addressed whether Clements was entitled to attorney's fees. I.C. § 34-13-3-5 provides as follows:


In State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. 2004), the Indiana Supreme Court held that this statute did not apply to a complaint against a county prosecutor for reimbursement of public funds that were "misappropriated, diverted or unaccounted for," but left for another day whether "the statute would afford reimbursement to a defendant who prevails."


The Court's criticism of the wisdom of the County's action makes the scope of its holding unclear. While it likely intended that I.C. § 34-13-3-5 allows for reimbursement of attorney's fees anytime the State or a political subdivision brings an unsuccessful action against a person entitled to governmental immunity, it does not clearly make such a holding. Rather, its emphasis on the "highly questionable" nature of the lawsuit means that litigants are likely to disagree on whether I.C. § 34-13-3-5 applies in these situations only when a political subdivisions lawsuit is unsuccessful or when it is both unsuccessful and highly questionable.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
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In this case, the plaintiff discovered a fire in the first floor living room of her
home. She called 911 and the fire department arrived on the scene. However, the fire department did not immediately enter the house to look for the family. After the firemen eventually entered the house, they found the family, including one dead child. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against Peru, the Peru Fire Department, and others. Peru and the Peru Fire Department filed a motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were "barred by common law immunity, which bars liability of governmental entities for negligent firefighting or rescue." The trial court denied that motion. An interlocutory appeal followed.

On appeal, the Court found that the plaintiffs' claims were too inclusive, because the complaint named too many defendants.


The Court went on to find that Peru was entitled to governmental immunity.


Sometimes, not even the most sympathetic facts can achieve a favorable outcome. Political subdivisions are immune from suits for inadequate fire protection. The Court's introductory point is also worth noting, though. Plaintiffs need not name all relevant departments within a political subdivision as defendants - naming the political subdivision itself is sufficient.

Brad A. Catlin
Price Waicukauski & Riley, LLC
Learn more about Brad and contact us
Download a copy of this article here