Yesterday, the Indiana Court of Appeals demonstrated one away that a party can play with fire on appeal in
, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), Cause No. 49A05-1011-CT-715. And, in this case, the party got burned.
less..
Snyder was a pastor at the Bloomfield United Methodist Church. A parishioner in the Bloomfield church alleged that Snyder acted in a manner inconsistent with his ministerial duties. An investigation was undertaken and Snyder was placed on an involuntary leave of absence. Eventually, Snyder filed a complaint seeking damages for breach of contract and defamation. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment on Snyder's breach of contract claim, but denied summary judgment on the defamation claim. The defendants appealed.
Because the claims involved a pastor and his religious duties, First Amendment principals prevented the Court from delving too deep into Snyder's suitability as a minister. Therefore, one of the primary issues on appeal was whether the allegedly defamatory statements had religious connotations.
On appeal (and presumably before the trial court), Snyder relied on the Court's recent decision in
West v. Wadlington, 908 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The decision in
West was published on June 10, 2009. The defendants moved for summary judgment on July 29, 2009, and moved for reconsideration on August 10, 2010. The trial court entered its judgment on October 26, 2010.
In the meantime, on September 26, 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in
West and
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Snyder apparently either did not Shepardize
West when drafting his appellate brief or did not understand the import of the Supreme Court's decision and relied entirely on the Court of Appeals's decision in
West on appeal. This was a mistake.
Given the lack of valid legal authority presented by Reverend Snyder, we agree with the Appellants that this argument is waived. See
Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring a party's contentions to be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to the legal authorities relied on);
Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)("The purpose of the appellate rules, especially Ind. Appellate Rule 46, is to aid and expedite review, as well as to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case."). Under this circumstance, we review the Appellants' claim for prima facie error.
See Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311, 314 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("Generally, a party waives any allegation of error if the party fails to provide any citation to authority or statutes. ... Such is akin to failure to file a brief, and subjects the appellee to reversal upon the appellant's showing of prima facie error.").
The Court then reviewed the facts and concluded that the defendants had made a prima facie showing that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment on Snyder's defamation claim. Therefore, it reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment on this issue.
We will likely never know whether Snyder's unwise reliance on
West is the key factor that led to the Court's decision. The Court may have come to the same conclusion, even if the defendants were not required to simply demonstrate a prima facie case of error. However, Snyder's case was surely not helped by the Court's invocation of that principal. This just goes to show that you must always Shepardize all of you cases at every stage in the
proceeding. You never know when your key authority may no longer be viable law.
