March 25, 2011
Recently, we discussed a case in which the Seventh Circuit held that a district court erred when focusing on what a plaintiff knew or should have known when determining whether an amendment to a complaint related back. Yesterday, the Indiana Court of Appeals demonstrated the difference between Indiana and federal law on this point in a memorandum decision, uncitable as authority under
App. R. 65(D),
Guzman v. Gray, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), Cause No. 30A01-1009-CT-445.
less..
Guzman was incarcerated in the Hancock County Jail. While in jail, other inmates forced him to do repeated squats. The damage to Guzman's muscles caused a medical condition that caused Guzman to be hospitalized.
Almost two years after he was released from the hospital, Guzman served a tort claim notice on the Hancock County Sheriff and filed a complaint against the Sheriff that alleged negligence. The Sheriff sent a letter to Guzman's counsel alerting him to the failure to file the tort claim notice within 180 days. He later filed an and sent a second letter to Guzman's counsel, repeating the first and threatening to seek sanctions if Guzman continued to pursue the litigation.
The Sheriff moved for summary judgment on the basis that Guzman did not timely serve his tort claim notice. Guzman responded and moved to amend his complaint. Guzman's proposed amended complaint changed the theory of recovery from a state tort claim to a theory of recovery under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of Guzman’s constitutional right. The trial court denied Guzman's motion to amend and granted the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. In so doing, it focused almost exclusively on Guzman's conduct.
Here, Guzman's counsel conceded at the hearing on the motion to amend his complaint that he knew "fairly early on" that the original complaint lacked merit as filed because Guzman did not serve a tort claim notice on Gray within 180 days from the date of his injury as required by statute. However, Guzman's counsel attempted to rationalize his failure to withdraw the complaint because it was necessary to preserve other potential causes of action before the statutes of limitation expired.
Guzman's counsel was also notified by Gray's opposing counsel that the tort claim would fail. At the time of that notification, no responsive pleading had been filed, so Guzman could have amended his complaint to change the theory of recovery as a matter of course. Nevertheless, Guzman chose not to amend and Gray was thereby forced to answer an admittedly meritless complaint. Guzman's only explanation for not filing before Gray responded was that "a little more time got by me than I would have liked."
Gray again notified Guzman's counsel that Guzman's tort claim would fail and further informed Guzman's counsel that Guzman could be assessed attorney fees and costs if the complaint was not dismissed. Again, Guzman did nothing. Only after Gray filed a motion for summary judgment did Guzman respond with a motion for leave to amend his complaint.
...
Guzman argues that Gray was put on notice as to the facts alleged by Guzman and that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Guzman the opportunity to amend his complaint to change the legal theory of recovery. Guzman claims he sought to amend his complaint because the two-year statute of limitations had not yet run on a constitutional rights violation brought under § 1983 and leave to amend would have related that claim back to the date the original complaint was filed. Indeed, had Guzman initially filed a claim against Gray for a violation of his constitutional rights instead of a tort action, he would have been within the applicable statute of limitations. Instead, Guzman decided to file a tort claim as a placeholder, a claim he knew to be fatally flawed by the lack of a prior tort claim notice. Moreover, Guzman failed to amend his complaint early on, which forced Gray to incur increased costs in defending against the complaint.
Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Guzman's motion for leave to amend his complaint.
It is fair to say that the Seventh Circuit would have approached this case differently. It will be interesting to see if litigants are able to convince Indiana's appellate courts to apply the new federal test to the question of whether an amendment will relate back or whether Indiana's courts will continue to focus on the conduct of the plaintiff when making this decision.
Lessons:
- Indiana does not apply the same test as the federal courts when determining whether an amendment to a complaint relates back.
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