December 30, 2011
Last year,
we told you about a decision from the Indiana Court of Appeals that dealt with whether parents of a stillborn child could receive emotional distress damages. The Indiana Supreme Court later granted transfer in that case and, on December 13, 2011, rendered its decision in
Spangler v. Bechtel, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2011). This decision also allowed the parents' claims for damages to proceed.
less..
In this case, a pregnant woman was admitted to a hospital in active labor the child died
in utero prior to devlivery. The parents brought negligence actions against the hospital, the nurse-midwife who managed the labor, and the nurse-midwife's employer. As of the date of the unborn child's death, Indiana law precluded any claim for damages under the Child Wrongful Death Act. Therefore, the parents sought only damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to all three defendants and the Court of Appeals reversed as to all three.
The Court held that the fact "that the CWDA provides no remedy for wrongful death damages for the death of an unborn child does not preclude the availability of a separate action for damages founded on a basis other than wrongful death." Therefore, "parents who have suffered a stillbirth of their child are not precluded by the
CWDA from seeking emotional distress damages in a negligence action." The Court then addressed whether the parents could recover under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Court described the history of this tort in Indiana, noting that there are two variations: (1) the modified impact rule and (2) the bystander rule. The Court recognized that the Court of Appeals had urged the Court to abandon the modified impact and bystander rules altogether on many occassions in favor of a general test of "direct involvement." It did not agree.
A "direct involvement" standard is likely to encounter the same problems as those faced by one testing the genuineness and foreseeability of alleged emotional distress, which has been utilized by other states. ... A pure foreseeability rule is "unsatisfactory because genuine emotional disturbance can occur and is foreseeable in many situations in which courts clearly would not permit recovery." A general standard of "direct involvement" would not be any more precise. We have found no other comprehensive uniform principle capable of satisfactorily reflecting the range of circumstances where liability for emotional distress is appropriate.
The Court then held that the trial court erred when it concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were precluded due to the absence of any negligently-inflicted injuries on another.
[Proof of a negligently-inflicted death or severe injury to another] is not required for emotional distress claims brought under the modified impact rule, where we have permitted recovery so long as the plaintiff personally sustained a physical impact, in addition to emotional distress damages. An action seeking emotional distress damages, if predicated not on the bystander rule but on the modified impact rule, does not require the negligent infliction of injury on a person other than the plaintiff.
In this decision, the Court emphasized two main points. First, it likes the way that it has defined negligent infliction of emotional distress and does not wish to alter that definition. Second, negligent infliction of emotional distress is not a derivative claim, such as loss of consortium.
Lessons:
- The Child Wrongful Death Act does not preclude claims for emotional distress damages by parents who have suffered a stillbirth of their child.
- Indiana will not apply a "direct involvement" test to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
- Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not a derivative claim.
- The defendant's negligence in breaching a legal duty is a required predicate to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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