February 8, 2011
In
Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit held that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) completely preempted any state law retaliation claim against an employer governed by the RLA. Today, the Seventh Circuit overruled that decision in
Hughes v. United Airlines, Inc., Case No. 10-1129.
less..
In
Hughes, the plaintiff was physically unable to work and received a medical leave. Upon her return to work, less than a week before her first flight assignment, she slipped and fell at United's training facility, suffering a new injury so severe that she could not fly. United then ended her employment. Hughes says that this constituted retaliation for the workers' compensation claim she made on account of the new injury; for its part, however, United characterizes the termination as a routine application of the collective bargaining agreement's limit on how long an inactive employee can retain seniority.
Hughes sued in state court and United removed the case to federal court, arguing that the RLA completely preempted the state-law retaliation claim. The Court explained the doctrine of "complete preemption" as follows:
"Complete preemption" is a misleadingly named doctrine that applies to subjects over which federal law is so pervasive that it is impossible to make out a state-law claim, no matter how careful the pleading. Several branches of labor-relations law come within this description. Preemption normally is a defense, which must be pleaded and established in the court where the litigation began. But "complete preemption" is not a defense. It means that the claim itself arises under federal law. If "complete preemption" applies to Hughes's retaliatory-discharge suit, then United was entitled to remove it; but if United's argument is a species of ordinary preemption, then all it has is a defense that must be asserted in state court, unless the diversity jurisdiction supports removal.
The Court then discussed its prior decision in
Graf and two subsequent decisions from the United States Supreme Court that "pull[ed] the rug out from under
Graf. In earlier opinions, the Court had not discussed this precise issue, but "the absence of a discussion is just silence," not a decision. Based on the United States Supreme Court's precedent, the Court held that the case should be remanded.
Graf's holding that the RLA completely preempts retaliatory-discharge suits under state law is overruled. This suit must be remanded to state court, because both Hughes and United are citizens of Illinois. United submits that Hughes cannot prevail unless the court considers, and rejects, its contention that the collective bargaining agreement required her discharge after three years on medical leave. If "the state-law claim is dependent on the interpretation
of a CBA", then her claim is preempted. But the state judiciary (subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States) is the right forum for United's argument on that subject; it would be inappropriate for us to discuss it.
We are unfamiliar with the details of retaliation claims under the RLA, so are unable to determine whether this decision will benefit plaintiffs or defendants more. However, it is clear that these claims will be brought in state court, rather than federal court, in the future.
Lessons:
- The doctrine of complete preemption can be a basis for removal to federal court.
- State-law retaliation claims are not completely preempted by the RLA.
- A court's failure to address a legal issue is not an indication of how it will rule on that issue.
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