August 17, 2011
If a manager uniformly assigns undesirable duties to a distinct racial group, but doesn't include one member of that racial group in those assignments, is there a basis for inferring that the manager is biased against that racial group? A district court judge said, "No, this evidence does not support such an inference." However, on August 8, 2011, the Seventh Circuit disagreed in
Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2011), No. 10-3073. The Court found "that there is no token exception to anti-discrimination law" and reversed a decision in favor of the employer.
less..
In this case, two people worked for Kraft in its shipping department. Both of these individuals were Hispanic. Michalec was the supervisor of the shipping department. He would send the two people and other Hispanic employees outside to scrub parking lots, clean sewers, and tend to other disliked tasks "as often as possible" during the cold winter months, but he did not assign non-Hispanic employees to similar labors. Other events occurred, which led the company to eliminate the positions of these two employees, while Michalec prevented them from applying for new positions - positions that were ultimately filled by non-Hispanic employees.
The two employees ultimately filed suit, asserting violations of their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq.. Kraft moved for summary judgment and the district court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue on whether racial animus motivated any of Kraft's actions and granted summary judgment for Kraft. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Court noted that a plaintiff can prove discrimination under Title VII by using one of two methods of proof: (1) the direct method and (2) the indirect method.
Under the direct method, the plaintiff must produce either direct or circumstantial evidence that would permit a jury to infer that discrimination motivated an adverse employment action. Direct evidence is something close to an explicit admission by the employer that a particular decision was motivated by discrimination; this type of evidence is rare, but it "uniquely reveals" the employer's intent to discriminate.
The plaintiffs argued that Michalec exhibited his bias against Hispanics by assigning them to disfavored tasks such as scrubbing parking lots and cleaning sewers outside during the winter, because Michalec did not assign non-Hispanic employees to these duties. The district court concluded that these facts could suggest bias, but that the evidence did not support this inference because another Hispanic employee was not assigned to the same unwanted tasks. The Court disagreed.
We reject this line of analysis. Title VII would have little force if an employer could defeat a claim of discrimination by treating a single member of the protected class in accordance with the law. Suppose the district court's view carried the day: a female employee suffering from discrimination on the basis of her sex would have to establish that her employer discriminated against all women in the workplace to assert a sex discrimination claim. That, sensibly, is not how Title VII operates. Instead, "[t]he principal focus of the statute is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole."
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982);
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978) (recognizing that fairness to the class of women employees does not excuse discrimination against an individual female employee). Discrimination against one Hispanic employee violates the statute, no matter how well another Hispanic employee is treated. See
Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001). We agree with the plaintiffs that there is no token exception to anti-discrimination law.
The fact that the indirect method of proof involves questions related to "similarly situated employees" is irrelevant when a plaintiff is proceeding under the direct method of proof.
Under the direct method, the fact that Michalec treated another Hispanic worker well at most might be a piece of evidence tending to negate discrimination with respect to Diaz and Peña, but that is the precise question of intent that a jury must resolve. We need not decide whether evidence that Michalec assigned Hispanic workers to disfavored tasks is enough by itself to enable the plaintiffs to survive summary judgment, since there is more.
The Court went on to list the other series of events that would support an inference of discrimination and reversed the district court's decision.
Lessons:
- An employee can demonstrate a Title VII violation through either a direct or indirect method of proof.
- If an employee is proving a Title VII violation through the direct method of proof, an employer is not entitled to summary judgment merely because a member of the same ethnic group was not subject to the same discriminatory conduct.
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